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Against the background of the emergence of macroeconomic imbalances within the
European Monetary Union (EMU), we investigate in this paper the macroeconomic
consequences of cross-border banking in monetary unions such as the Euro area. For this
purpose, we incorporate a union-wide banking sector along the lines in an otherwise
standard two-region monetary union DSGE model, accounting for borrowing constraints
of entrepreneurs and impatient households and an internal constraint on the bank’s
leverage ratio. We illustrate in particular how rule-of-thumb lending standards based on
the macroeconomic performance of the core region within the monetary union can
translate into destabilizing spill-over effects into the other region, resulting in an overall
higher macroeconomic volatility. Thereby, we demonstrate a channel through which the
financial sector may have exacerbated the emergence of macroeconomic imbalances
within the EMU. This effect may be mitigated by macroprudential policies, where
especially policies that force the bank’s lending standards to be less procyclical prove to
be effective in stabilizing output in both regions of the monetary union.
Keywords: Cross-Border Banking, Euro Area, Monetary Unions, DSGE,
Macroprudential Policies
1. INTRODUCTION
Understanding the transmission mechanisms and macroeconomic consequences
of cross-border banking has become a central importance for global financial and
macroeconomic stability. Indeed, while foreign direct investment (FDI) and equity
portfolio investment (EPI) are conducive to increased international risk sharing
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and may thus contribute to higher macrofinancial stability, bank-related cross-
border flows are more procyclical and volatile, especially in adverse economic
situations when sharp reversals of capital flows and reserve adjustments may
occur, as discussed in CIEPR (2012).
Given the well-known predominance of the banking sector in the European
financial landscape, where the expansion in cross-border financial activities over
the last 20 years took place primarily in the form of bank-related capital flows,
these issues are of central importance for the European Monetary Union (EMU)
[BIS (2010), Kleimeier et al. (2013)]. The macroeconomic effects of increased
cross-border financial flows in the EMU in recent times have been ambiguous.
While initially the increased cross-border flows may have supported economic
convergence processes within EMU, cross-border banking was a driving fac-
tor also for the credit booms and housing bubbles in some European countries
such as Spain and Ireland, and thereby contributed to the build-up of desta-
bilizing intra-EMU current account imbalances [see, e.g., Allen et al. (2011),
BIS (2011), and Gnimassoun and Mignon (2016)]. Further, as European banks
had an unexpectedly large exposure to the U.S. securitized asset markets on the
onset of the 2007–2009 global financial crisis, they played a central role in its
accruement and propagation from the United States to the European continent
[Borio and Disyatat (2011)].
Against this background, in this paper, we investigate the role of cross-border
bank credit flows in a two-region monetary union by incorporating a union-wide
banking sector in an otherwise standard two-country DSGE framework. Our model
defines a financially constrained union-wide bank with national retail branches in
each region of the monetary union, where cross-border banking constitutes the
allocation of loans to credit-constrained firms and households in each region. As
the main contribution of the paper, we evaluate the macroeconomic consequences
of cross-border banking under alternative lending standards in a core and a pe-
riphery region, and evaluate the impact of different macroprudential policies on
macroeconomic stability.
Based on recent empirical evidence from the ECB’s bank lending survey (BLS),
which suggests that lending standards in the Euro area have been procyclical in
recent times [Cihák and Brooks (2009)], we assume that the union-wide bank
suffers from asymmetric information and thus sets its lending standards, measured
by households’ and firms’ required loan-to-value (LTV) ratio in each region, on
the basis of the region’s last period output gap. We contrast this scenario with an
alternative rule-of-thumb scenario where the global bank sets a uniform lending
standard for both regions on the basis of the last period output gap in the core region.
The motivation for this alternative heuristic is the observation of a convergence in
lending standards at the beginning of EMU, where financial markets applied the
low risk premia of core economies also to the periphery. Our model thus allows to
evaluate the role of financial integration in the transmission and amplification of
shocks throughout the monetary union through the lens of a bounded rationality
environment. Throughout the paper, we define the core of the EMU to consist
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of Germany, France, the Netherlands, Finland, Belgium, and Austria, and the
periphery to include Spain, Greece, Portugal, Ireland, and Italy.1
Without aiming to deliver a complete explanation for the sizeable capital inflows
into some of the periphery countries of the EMU, this latter scenario is intended
to capture the effect of convergence of credit conditions at the start of the Euro-
pean monetary union. This is illustrated in Figure 1, where we illustrate banks’
subjective and qualitative assessment of the changes in their lending behavior
and in credit conditions asked from both enterprises and households as collected
in the ECB’s BLS. Banks’ qualitative survey answers are collected in diffusion
indices that give the difference between the weighted sum of the percentage of
banks stating that conditions have tightened and those stating that conditions have
eased.2 We aggregate country-specific diffusion indices across our definition of the
core and the periphery regions of EMU in order to visualize both the procyclicality
of lending conditions and the convergence across EMU member states.3
The graphs in Figure 1 show that lending conditions in the early years of EMU
became easier as more banks gave answers indicating they were less strict in their
credit standards, shown by falling diffusion indices. At the same time, we observe
a convergence in lending conditions between the core and the periphery region.
This pattern applies both to credit standards in general, and to collateral require-
ments demanded from enterprises as well as LTV ratios demanded for household
mortgages. As can also be clearly observed, in 2008, at the start of the recession
following the global financial crisis as well as in 2011 at the start of the recession
due to the European sovereign debt crisis, EMU banks tightened credit standards
sharply, especially in the periphery region. Conversely, in nonrecessionary or
expansionary periods, we observe a loosening in credit standards. Overall, this
indicates that banks in the EMU have indeed used procyclical lending standards
in recent decades and that the convergence in risk premia at the start of EMU was
also reflected in lending standards in general.
Calibrating the model to the EMU, we evaluate the nature of cross-border
banking and trading flows in a monetary union with different LTV-based lending
standards. In the baseline scenario, bank’s desired LTV ratio of firms is assumed to
be constant and equal across regions. The baseline scenario may thus be regarded as
capturing the case with symmetric information regarding firms’ and households’
net worth in both regions. In the second scenario, the LTV ratio is driven by
the region-specific previous output gaps. Thereby, a positive economic situation
not only affects firms’ net worth directly, but also serves as a signal for banks’
assessment of firms’ creditworthiness, resulting in procyclical lending standards.
In the third scenario, we assume that there exists one dominating core region
providing the signal for creditworthiness across the whole monetary union. This
scenario may be regarded as capturing the convergence in risk-premia across EMU
countries with the introduction of the common currency. We evaluate the impact of
regional technology shocks and discount factor shocks across the three scenarios.
In a nutshell, our simulation results highlight the role of cross-border lending
under asymmetric information not only as an amplifying mechanism within a
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FIGURE 1. Diffusion indices of qualitative changes in credit standards, collateral requirements for loans to enterprises, and LTV ratios for household
mortgages. Source: ECB bank lending survey. (a) Credit standards. (b) Collateral requirements. (c) LTV ratios for mortgages.
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monetary union, but also as a potential source of macroeconomic instability. More
precisely, while cross-border lending amplifies the effects of exogenous shocks in
all three considered scenarios, in the latter one—where there is a core region which
implicitly determines the lending standards for the whole monetary union—unified
lending standards lead to the occurrence of business fluctuations in the periphery
region driven purely by laxer credit conditions, and not by macroeconomic fun-
damentals. Hence, the financial sector may work to exacerbate the emergence of
macroeconomic imbalances in a monetary union if banks assign lending standards
from one core region to the whole monetary union. Some of these destabilizing
effects can be mitigated by macroprudential policies as shown in four policy
experiments. Especially policies that aim at forcing the bank’s lending standards
to be less procyclical are effective in reducing output volatility, while policies that
restrict the bank’s leverage ratio stabilize the leverage position and also to some
extent reduce output volatility in both regions.
In modern DSGE models, the banking sector has only recently received more
attention. While models accounting for a financial accelerator as in Bernanke
et al. (1999) or Iacoviello (2005) are now relatively common, most models do
not feature a detailed banking sector. Gerali et al. (2010) set up a DSGE model
with an imperfectly competitive banking sector subject to an internal leverage
constraint and entrepreneurs facing a borrowing constraint. Estimating the model
on Euro area data, the authors report that shocks originating in the banking sector
explain the largest share of the contraction of economic activity in 2008, while
macroeconomic shocks play only a limited role. A similar result is obtained in
Kollmann et al. (2011) in an estimated two-country model for the United States
and the Euro area as well as in the empirical study by Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2013).
In a simplified version of the model by Gerali et al. (2010), Gambacorta and
Signoretti (2014) analyze whether monetary policy should also target asset prices
or credit in the presence of borrowing constraints on firms’ side and a banking
sector with a credit supply constraint. They show that leaning-against-the-wind
policies by the central bank in reaction to supply side shocks allow for a better
trade-off between output and inflation stabilization. Hence, the authors reinforce
the results obtained by Cúrdia and Woodford (2010) in a much simpler model
with exogenously introduced interest rate spreads. In the theoretical model of this
paper, we build on the work of Gerali et al. (2010) and Gambacorta and Signoretti
(2014) to evaluate the effect of borrowing and credit supply constraints in a two-
region monetary union, focusing on spill-over effects of changes in cross-border
lending standards between the regions and the effects of macroprudential policies.
Our analysis relates to both the empirical and the theoretical literature on the
relationship between bank lending conditions, macroeconomic outcomes, and
monetary policy. Evidence that lending conditions in the EMU tend to be procycli-
cal is provided in Cihák and Brooks (2009) and CIEPR (2012). Maddaloni and
Peydrò (2013) estimate GLS panel regressions using the ECB’s BLS to evaluate the
relationship between monetary policy rates and bank lending standards before and
after the 2008 financial crisis. The authors report evidence of a softening in lending
conditions due to the expansive monetary policy during the crisis and suggestive
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evidence of excessive risk-taking for mortgage loans before the crisis. In a two-
country DSGE model with financial frictions, Gruss and Sgherri (2009) define
LTV ratios as an AR process with a shock component and show that changes in
financial conditions account for a large portion of variation in real GDP. Similarly,
Gerali et al. (2010) report that shocks to LTV ratios demanded from firms can
explain a large share of both the expansion before and the contraction during the
recent financial crisis. Finally, Hristov et al. (2014) estimate panel VAR models
with sign restrictions to evaluate interest rate pass-through during the crisis. The
authors show that the decrease in pass-through is related to an increase in banking
frictions in the DSGE model of Gerali et al. (2010). Our approach extends this
literature by capturing the procyclicality in LTV ratios as we explicitly relate
bank’s lending standards to the evolution of the business cycle.
Moreover, our paper is related to the models with cross-border banking and
global banks in Ueda (2012), Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2013), Kamber and Thoenissen
(2013), in ’t Veld et al. (2014), and Poutineau and Vermandel (2015). Both Ueda
(2012) and Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2013) focus on the effect of real and financial
shocks in two-country DSGE models with financially constrained national banks
or a global bank, respectively, and report that financial shocks may cause an in-
ternational synchronization of business cycles. The three-country New Keynesian
model analyzed in in ’t Veld et al. (2014) analyzes the emergence of international
capital flows in a monetary union like the EMU. More related to our approach,
Kamber and Thoenissen (2013) incorporate a banking sector à la Gerali et al.
(2010) into an international RBC model of a small open economy. The authors
assume that banks in the small open home economy extend loans also to firms
in the large foreign economy, and show that the propagation of foreign financial
shocks to the home economy depends on the degree of financial integration of the
domestic banking sector. Similarly, Poutineau and Vermandel (2015) investigate
cross-border financial flows in an estimated DSGE model of a currency union
with a core and a periphery region. In line with our results, the authors demon-
strate that cross-border flows provide a channel through which asymmetric shocks
may diffuse throughout the monetary union, thereby increasing the sensitivity of
real variables to financial shocks. All of these previous approaches differ from
ours in that we model cross-border lending via the specification of a financially
constrained union-wide bank with loan retail branches at the national level, and
analyze the effects of changes in the banks’ lending standards across the monetary
union.
The policy analysis of this paper focuses on the effects of macroprudential poli-
cies in our model framework. The previous literature discusses several macropru-
dential instruments, such as LTV caps, debt-to-income caps, or levies on noncore
liabilities [Allen et al. (2011), CIEPR (2012)]. Previous theoretical analyses such
as Lambertini et al. (2013), Quint and Rabanal (2014), and Brzoza-Brzezina et al.
(2015) focus on policies that force the LTV ratio to be countercyclical or that limit
the fraction of liabilities the bank can lend. The studies evaluate welfare effects for
borrowers and savers or for core and periphery regions, respectively. Evaluating the
impact of asymmetric shocks on the core and the periphery, Brzoza-Brzezina et al.
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(2015) show that macroprudential policy can reduce macroeconomic volatility if
it is decentralized in each region. Lambertini et al. (2013) and Quint and Rabanal
(2014) provide evidence that particularly savers benefit from macroprudential
policies. We add to this literature by evaluating a range of macroprudential policy
instruments with different scenarios for the evolution of banks’ lending conditions
across the regions.
Finally, our approach is more broadly related to other DSGE models of a
monetary union, such as Benigno (2004), Galı́ and Monacelli (2008), Beetsma
and Jensen (2005), Duarte and Wolman (2008), Ferrero (2009), and Engler et al.
(2017). While the former three papers evaluate optimal monetary and fiscal policy
rules in a monetary union, the latter three papers focus more specifically on
problems related to fiscal policy in a monetary union, such as possibilities to
improve inflation differentials with fiscal policy, or to use fiscal devaluation to
counteract macroeconomic imbalances.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we set up
a two-region DSGE model of a monetary union with a cross-border banking
sector consisting of an international wholesale branch and region-specific retail
branches as in Gerali et al. (2010) and Gambacorta and Signoretti (2014). In
Section 3, we analyze the dynamic adjustments of the model’s main variables
to unexpected regional technology and discount factor shocks, as well as the
consequences of alternative specifications of the lending standards by the banking
sector. Moreover, we present the results of four different macroprudential policy
experiments. Finally, we draw some concluding remarks in Section 4.
2. THE MODEL
We consider a two-region monetary union populated by a continuum of agents
on the interval [0, 1], a segment [0, n] residing in a region labeled H (the periph-
ery), and the other segment living in the other region labeled F (the core). We
assume that the periphery H is the risky region, and the core F is the safe-haven
region. There is no labor mobility between the regions.4 Both regions are assumed
to produce tradable consumption goods, which are considered to be imperfect
substitutes due to a standard home bias argument. Since we model a monetary
union, the nominal exchange rate between the regions is constant and may be
normalized to one. Throughout this section, notation is generally given for the
periphery region H , where analogous relationships apply for the core region F ,
unless otherwise stated.
2.1. Households
Households in both regions are infinitely lived and have identical preferences
and endowments within each region. Further, as in Iacoviello (2005), we assume
that there exist both patient and impatient households in both regions. Because
it is assumed that impatient households have a lower discount factor than patient
households (βi < βp), in equilibrium patient households save via deposits at
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banks and impatient households borrow in the form of loans from banks. Note
that our assumption of a lower discount factor for impatient households ensures
that the borrowing constraint will always bind in the neighborhood of the steady
state. Patient households are assumed to earn the same interest on their deposits
throughout the monetary union, which equals the risk-free monetary policy rate.
Impatient households are subject to a borrowing constraint depending on their
stock of housing collateral and the LTV ratio that banks demand. Households
maximize utility, which we assume to be separable in consumption, housing, and
leisure. In order to render the model stationary, we follow Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe
(2003) and assume that households face a small quadratic portfolio adjustment
cost θD when their deposits differ from the steady-state level D.
All households receive utility from consumption and housing services and
disutility from working. Additionally, we assume that patient households may be
subject to a stochastic shock that affects their discount rate.
Following Duarte and Wolman (2008) and Ferrero (2009), the aggregate con-
sumption bundle consumed by households in the periphery H contains region-
specific goods bundles from both regions and is defined as
CHHt = γpCpHt + γiCiHt
=
[(







where γp and γi denote the shares of patient and impatient households, Cht and C
f
t
represent bundles of retail consumption goods i produced in H and F , respectively,
σ denotes the elasticity of substitution between these two consumption bundles,
and the parameter ωH represents the steady-state import share of households in H .
Given our assumption of home bias in consumption, it holds that ωH < (1 − n).5
Assuming that the law of one price holds and fixing the nominal exchange
rate at one, retail prices for individual goods will be the same in both regions:
P ht (i) = P h∗t (i) and P ft (i) = P f ∗t (i), where P h∗t (i) and P f ∗t (i) are the prices
of goods Yht (i) and Y
f
t (i) in the other region, respectively. From the demand
functions for individual goods and defining the terms of trade as the price index
of goods produced in F relative to that of goods produced in H , Tt ≡ P ft /P ht ,
it is straightforward to derive expressions for relative prices in H and F , and the







(1 − ωF ) + ωF T σ−1t
(1 − ωH) + ωH T 1−σ
]1/1−σ
, (2)
where P Ht ≡ [(1 −ωH)(P ht )1−σ +ωH(P ft )1−σ ]1/1−σ denotes the CPI price index
in H and accordingly for F .6
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Moreover, we can relate the domestic retail inflation πht and π
f
t to CPI inflation
in the respective regions, defined as πHt ≡ P Ht /P Ht−1 and πFt ≡ P Ft /P Ft−1:
πHt = πht
[(
1 − ωH ) + ωH T 1−σt(





1 − ωF ) + ωF T σ−1t(
1 − ωF ) + ωF T σ−1t−1
]1/1−σ
. (4)
Patient households. In a standard manner, the utility maximization problem






































































where HpHt is the stock of housing of patient households in H with real price
qHHt , N
pH
t is the patient households’ labor supply in H , D
pH
t are deposits earning
interest rdt , π
H
t ≡ P Ht /P Ht−1 is the gross CPI inflation rate in H , (WpHt /P Ht ) is
the real wage, and 
Ht denotes real profits from retailers in H , which are paid
lump-sum to patient households. The parameter ap measures the degree of habit
persistence of patient households, the share of patient households in the economy
is denoted by γp, and ϑSH describes the stochastic discount factor shock which
is assumed to follow an exogenous AR(1) process with persistence parameter
ρs and i.i.d. shock process εSHt . Note that the discount factor shock is assumed
to be realized at the end of the period, so that it affects the discount factor in
the following period. Households then maximize the expected present discounted
value of intertemporal utility, which we assume to be separable in consumption,
housing and leisure.
From the FOCs of this intertemporal optimization problem, we obtain the
standard labor supply equation, a housing demand function and a consumption
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(1 − ap)βpϑSHt (1 + rdt )
(C
pH
t+1 − apCpHt )πHt+1
]
. (9)
Impatient households. Impatient households have a stronger preference for
current consumption, and therefore borrow in equilibrium. In line with Iacoviello
(2005), they are assumed to be constrained in their borrowing. This gives the






(1 − ai) ln
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CiHt − aiCiHt−1


















NiHt + BiHt , (11)












where BiHt denotes the amount of loans
7 borrowed by impatient households at the
loan rate rbHt and m
iH
t is the LTV ratio that banks demand of impatient households.
As is usual in the mortgage market, the LTV ratio gives the fraction that impatient
households may borrow against their housing collateral.
This yields the adjusted labor supply, housing demand, and consumption Euler
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Et
[
(1 − ap)βi(1 + rbHt )






where siHt is the Lagrange multiplier on the borrowing constraint.
2.2. Firms
Production is assumed to take place in two stages. In the first stage, entrepreneurs
in region H and in region F produce the intermediate good Yh,intt and Y
f,int
t in fully
competitive markets and under credit constraints as in Iacoviello (2005). In line
with Bernanke et al. (1999), we then assume that intermediate goods are sold to
retailers, who take their price as given and differentiate them at no cost. Due to the
differentiation of products, retailers are assumed to operate under monopolistic
competition and face a quadratic cost for the adjustment of prices as in Rotemberg
(1982). All profits from retail activities are rebated lump-sum to patient households
in the respective region.





t under perfect competition. Intermediate goods are used in the
production of a final consumption good and are assumed to be nontradable. En-
trepreneurs aim at maximizing their consumption and use capital goods and labor
for the production of intermediate goods. We assume that entrepreneurs consume
only goods from their own region. At the end of each period, entrepreneurs buy
new capital goods from capital producers, so that capital is only realized in the next
period. Investment into new capital goods is assumed to be financed with loans
from banks, where similar to impatient households we assume that entrepreneurs
have a lower discount factor than patient households.8 Following Iacoviello (2005),
we assume that entrepreneurs are credit-constrained due to the risk of default on
their loans and thus can only borrow up to a fraction of their collateral, i.e., their
capital assets. The resulting dynamics are similar to a financial accelerator effect as
in Bernanke et al. (1999). Again, the assumption of a lower discount factor βE for
firms ensures that the borrowing constraint will always bind in the neighborhood
of the steady state.
Entrepreneurs in H thus maximize consumption CEHt under habit for-
mation with degree ae and subject to their budget and their borrow-










CROSS-BORDER BANKING AND MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICIES 265
Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1365100518000214











































where CEHt is entrepreneurs’ consumption in H , B
EH
t is the amount borrowed
from banks at the loan rate (1 + rbHt ), NdpHt and NdiHt are the amounts of la-
bor from patient and impatient households demanded by entrepreneurs at the




t ≡ Ph,t /P h,intt denotes the markup of retail
over intermediate goods prices, KEHt is capital obtained at the price q
kH
t and
depreciated with rate δk . The Cobb–Douglas production function gives output as
a function of capital and labor inputs, α is the capital share, ξ is the labor share of
patient households, and AHt is an exogenous technology process which may differ
across regions. We define AHt as an exogenous AR(1) process with persistence
parameter ρa and i.i.d. shock process εAHt .
The borrowing constraint in (18) states that loans cannot exceed a fraction mEHt
of the real depreciated value of capital assets in relation to the interest obligations,
in order to mitigate potential losses from loan default as in the seminal financial
accelerator model by Bernanke et al. (1999). Hence, mEHt may be interpreted as
the LTV ratio that banks demand of entrepreneurs and, thus, gives a measure of
banks’ assessment regarding firms’ creditworthiness.


















(1 − ae)βe(1 + rbHt )
(CEHt+1 − aeCEHt )πHt+1
]
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Equation (20) describes the entrepreneurs’ Euler equation, where sEHt denotes
the Lagrange multiplier on the borrowing constraint and thus gives the marginal
value of one unit of borrowing. The relation in (21) gives the optimal relation
between entrepreneurs’ consumption and real returns from capital, given the bor-
rowing constraint. Finally, equations (22) and (23) show that in the optimum, real
wages equal the marginal product of labor of each household type.
Capital producers. As in Gerali et al. (2010) and Gambacorta and Signoretti
(2014), we assume that each period, capital production is undertaken by perfectly
competitive capital producers, which are owned by entrepreneurs. These firms buy
last period’s depreciated capital stock from entrepreneurs as well as an investment
It in the form of new final goods from retailers and use both to produce the new
capital stock. In line with previous authors, we assume that old capital stock can
be transformed one-for-one into new capital stock, while investment from final
goods underlies a quadratic adjustment cost for the transformation into capital
goods. At the end of the period, the resulting new capital stock is sold back to
entrepreneurs.
Defining xHt ≡ KEHt − (1 − δk)KEHt−1 , capital goods producers in H then

























⎦ IHt , (25)
where EHk,t ≡ βke U ′(CEHt+k ) = βke λEHt+k , with k = 0, 1, ..., is the stochastic discount
factor from entrepreneurs, which are assumed to own capital producing firms, and
λEHt is the Lagrange multiplier on entrepreneur’s budget constraint. The capital
adjustment cost is denoted by κI , which we assume to be equal across regions.
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Retailers. Retailers in regions H and F buy intermediate goods Yh,intt or Y
f,int
t
from entrepreneurs in a competitive market, taking their price P h,intt or P
f,int
t as
given. These intermediate goods are then differentiated into final consumption
goods at no cost, so that retailers operate under monopolistic competition. Addi-
tionally, they are assumed to face quadratic costs for the adjustment of prices as
in Rotemberg (1982). In our two-region model, retailers are symmetric, but face
the demand from consumers in both the regions as well as from the entrepreneurs
of their own region.
Aggregating over households and entrepreneurs, world demand for individual
retail goods for retailers in H is then derived from the demand equations of
households and from entrepreneurs, measured in units per domestic firm. Note
that we model the elasticity of substitution for individual goods produced in H as
a region-specific exogenous process εHt . This gives the total demand for individual


































where CWHt denotes aggregate world demand for retail goods from region H , with
γi and γe denoting the shares of impatient households and entrepreneurs in the
economy. Similarly, the expression for world demand for goods produced in the
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Moreover, we derive the trade balance from net foreign demand of tradable



























































Individual retailers in H then set the price P ht (i) for the individual final good


























where HHk,t ≡ βkpU ′(CpHt+k) = βkpλHHt+k , with k = 0, 1, ..., is the stochastic discount
factor from patient households’ utility maximization in H , πht = P ht /P ht−1 defines
retail price inflation and κp denotes the adjustment cost for changing prices. The
maximization problem is subject to total demand for the final good as derived
above in (27).
Imposing a symmetric equilibrium, this yields the following optimality condition:

















Finally, the exogenous process for the elasticity of substitution is related to retail-
ers’ markup shock mkHt in region H via the relation mk
H
t = εHt /(εHt − 1). We
model the markup shock as an AR(1) process with persistence ρmk and an i.i.d.
shock process εmkHt .
2.3. The Banking Sector
Building on the models by Gerali et al. (2010) and Gambacorta and Signoretti
(2014), we assume that there exists a representative bank in the monetary union
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which consists of an union-wide wholesale branch and national retail branches in
each region of the monetary union. The bank may thus be regarded as a global
bank as in Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2013) assuming that the world consists only of
the monetary union. The wholesale branch decides upon credit conditions in each
region by setting the lending standards of impatient households’ and entrepreneurs’
credit constraints as well as the loan rates and thus governs cross-border lending.
In that sense, the banking sectors within the monetary union are assumed to be
completely integrated.
The wholesale branch is responsible for collecting deposits from households
throughout the monetary union and distributes the resulting funds to the retail
branches at the internal loan rates RbH and RbF . The retail branches then provide
credit to entrepreneurs in their region of residence. Note that in this setup, banks
cannot endogenously create new credit. The wholesale branch is additionally
responsible for adhering to the exogenous constraint on the bank’s leverage ratio,
which is modeled in the form of a quadratic cost of deviating from the target
value ν. The value of ν could for instance be interpreted as reflecting regula-
tory legislation regarding banks’ equity holdings. The credit-supply channel thus
introduces an additional feedback loop between real and financial conditions in
the sense that the loan rates, as well as the spread between the loan rates and
the risk-free policy rate, depends on the bank’s leverage, its profit and, hence,
on macroeconomic conditions. Finally, retail branches in H,F are assumed to
operate under monopolistically competitive conditions, and thus charge a constant
markup μb on the internal loan rate RbH , i.e., RbF .
Aggregate deposits in the monetary union and aggregate lending to en-
trepreneurs and impatient households in both regions are defined as follows:
DHt = γpDpHt , (33)
DFt = γpDpFt , (34)
Dt = nDHt + (1 − n)DFt , (35)
BHt = γiBiHt + γeBEHt , (36)








)γ−1/γ + (1 − n)1/γ (BFt )γ−1/γ
]γ /γ−1
, (38)
where γp, γi , and γe give the shares of patient and impatient households as well
as entrepreneurs in both economies, BHt and B
F
t denote the credit supply given to
retail branches in regions H and F , respectively, and γ denotes the bank’s elasticity
of substitution between lending to both regions. We thus assume that loans to the
two regions are imperfect substitutes from the point of view of the bank, which may
be motivated with the notion of a historically more sound economic performance
in the core region, as well as with differences in the credit screening capabilities
due to longer lasting borrower–lender relationships and different legal systems
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in both regions [Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001), Poutineau and Vermandel (2015)].
In our setup, the wholesale branch thus aims at maximizing profits subject to a






















)γ−1/γ + (1 − n)1/γ (BFt )γ−1/γ
]γ /γ−1
, (41)
where Kbt is the banks’ own capital and the parameter θ gives the proportion of K
b
t
to which the cost of deviating from target applies. The bank’s leverage ratio and
its budget constraint are determined with respect to aggregate lending Bt . Solving
the maximization problem gives the internal loan rates for credit supply to retail
branches in regions H and F :






































Hence, extending the closed economy setup in Gambacorta and Signoretti
(2014) to the open economy case, it turns out that both the effect of the risk-
free deposit rate and of the leverage constraint on the loan rate are weighted with
the relative share of loan supply to the respective region, adjusted for region size.
This means that loan rates in a given region will be more sensitive to deviations
from the bank’s leverage target and to changes in the policy rate if the wholesale
branch distributes a larger share of its overall credit supply to this region.
As in Gambacorta and Signoretti (2014), the retail banks are then assumed
to be able to differentiate the wholesale loans at no costs and pass them under
monopolistic competition on to impatient households and entrepreneurs, charging
a constant markup μb, which we assume to be equal across regions in the monetary
union9:
rbHt = RbHt + μb, (44)
rbFt = RbFt + μb. (45)
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Finally, we define aggregate banks’ profits J bt as the sum of wholesale and retail
profits and assume that banks reinvest their profits into new bank capital, where a
fraction δb is used each period to pay for banking activities:









Kbt = (1 − δb)Kbt−1 + J bt−1. (47)
2.4. Monetary Policy
The central bank in the model controls the nominal risk-free interest rate rdt and
adjusts to inflation as in Bernanke et al. (1999). Since we model a currency union,
the central bank targets inflation in both regions, where the weight is given by
their relative size. This results in the following Taylor-type rule:





) + (1 − n) (πFt )]φπ
}1−ρ
εrdt , (48)
where ρ measures the amount of interest rate smoothing, r̄d the nominal steady-
state interest rate, φπ gives the strength of inflation targeting, and εrdt is an i.i.d.
monetary policy shock.
2.5. Asymmetric Information in the Banking Sector and
Rule-of-Thumb-Based Lending
As previously discussed [see also CIEPR (2012)], the recent experience of the
housing and credit boom-and-bust cycles in Spain and Ireland—which were fi-
nanced to a large extent by cross-border capital flows from Germany—seems to
suggest that global cross-border lending may not have been subject to the same
screening standards for creditworthiness as internal lending, and that this practice
may have thus contributed decisively to the recent macroeconomic instability of
those countries. Part of this behavior may be due to asymmetric information on
the part of banks regarding their borrowers’ true creditworthiness, which may be
exacerbated in global lending.
In addition to problems related to asymmetric information, countries within the
Euro area seem to have been subject to a perception of the financial sector that upon
entering into the EMU, the riskiness of loans in all regions was reduced to that of
the core region as could be witnessed with the reduction in loan spreads between
the core and the periphery of the EMU. Hence, banks and other members of the
financial market applied a simple heuristic when assessing the creditworthiness of
borrowers throughout the monetary union.
In our model, the union-wide bank uses the LTV ratios demanded from both
impatient households and entrepreneurs to measure its assessment of their credit-
worthiness. In order to capture the mechanisms regarding asymmetric information
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and the use of heuristics in lending in the most parsimonious manner, we differ-
entiate between three different cases:
In the baseline case, the union-wide bank sets both LTV constraints to be
constant and equal across regions:
mi,kt = mi ∀ t, k = {H,F }, (49)
mE,kt = mE ∀ t, k = {H,F }. (50)
Next, in order to capture the effect of asymmetric information on the bank’s
assessment of creditworthiness and the observed procyclicality of lending stan-
dards, we assume that the LTV ratios are time varying and related to the region’s
previous output gap:






, k = {H,F }, (51)






, k = {H,F }, (52)
where Ȳ k represents the k-region steady-state output. While this is of course a
convenient modeling shortcut, the rationale behind this specification is straightfor-
ward: In the real world, banks usually employ a screening mechanism to assess the
profitability of the investment projects to be financed, and thus the creditworthiness
of the loan applicants. To reflect this, we assume that the bank associates both the
value of households’ housing collateral as well as firms’ investment profitability
with the overall business cycle stance of the region’s economy. Accordingly, it
is natural to assume that a positive output gap—resulting, for instance, from a
positive TFP shock—leads to a relaxation of borrowing constraints by the bank as
its assessment of credit default risk is reduced. This specification is thus supposed
to reflect the procyclicality in lending behavior observable in the Euro area in
recent times [Cihák and Brooks (2009)]. Obviously, the determination of mi,kt and
m
E,k
t would be region-specific in the normal case and depend on the core’s and
the periphery’s output gap, respectively. We refer to this case as scenario 1 in the
following.
Finally, we consider an additional scenario where the lending standards in both
countries regions are determined uniformly solely on the observation of the core
region’s output gap, i.e.,






, k = {H,F }, (53)






, k = {H,F }. (54)
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This alternative specification of mi,kt and m
E,k
t solely as a function of (Y
F
t−1 −
Ȳ F )/Ȳ F is meant to represent the heuristic determination of lending standards in
cross-border banking within the Euro area discussed for instance by Allen et al.
(2011) and CIEPR (2012). In particular, this specification reflects the implicit risk
pooling associated with the establishment of monetary unions, and observable in
the excessively low sovereign risk premia of EMU countries and resulting interest
rate convergence during the 2000s, see, e.g., De Grauwe and Ji (2012) and Proaño
et al. (2014). We term this case scenario 2.
3. SIMULATIONS
3.1. Calibration
For the following simulations, we set our model parameters mainly as in Gerali
et al. (2010), who calibrate and partly estimate their model so as to match key
aspects of the Euro area real and financial sectors. Additionally, some parame-
ters relating to the open-economy aspect of the model are calibrated as in the
two-region model of the Euro area of Engler et al. (2017), which evaluates the
effect of a fiscal devaluation using the same definition for the core and periph-
ery regions of EMU. Table 1 reports all constant parameter values used in our
simulations.10
As in Gerali et al. (2010), the households’ discount factor βP is set at 0.996,
which implies a steady-state deposit and policy rate of about 2% (annualized).
The entrepreneurs’ discount factor βE is set at 0.975, as originally in Iacoviello
(2005), and the inverse of the Frisch elasticity η is set at 1 as in Galı́ (2008)
also. The share of capital in the aggregate production function α is set at 0.20,
and the depreciation rate of physical capital δk at 0.025 as in Gerali et al. (2010).
Further, we set the adjustment cost for changing prices κp at the value estimated by
Gerali et al. (2010) for the Euro area, namely 28.65. The elasticity of substitution
across regional goods bundles σ is set at 2 as in Engler et al. (2017). Concerning
the investment adjustment cost parameter κI , we set it at 5 as in Gambacorta
and Signoretti (2014) in their analysis of their model’s response to technology
shocks.11
The required LTV ratio for entrepreneurs set by the retail bank branches, mE , is
set at 0.35 in the baseline case, which is similar to the average ratio of long-term
loans to the value of shares and other equities for nonfinancial corporations in
the Euro area, see also Gerali et al. (2010) as well as Gambacorta and Signoretti
(2014). For impatient households, the average LTV ratio mI is set at 0.7, again
following Gerali et al. (2010). The sensitivity of both LTV ratios to output gaps
in scenarios 1 and 2 is assumed to be 0.5. The target leverage ratio ν and the cost
for managing the bank capital position δb are set at 9% and 0.049, respectively,
as in Gerali et al. (2010). Due to the lack of a more direct measure, we set the
bank capital adjustment cost θ at 11, the value estimated by Gerali et al. (2010).
The bank’s elasticity of substitution between loans to home and foreign, γ , is set
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TABLE 1. Calibration parameters
Parameter Description Value
βp Patient households’ discount factor 0.9943
βi Impatient households’ discount factor 0.975
βe Entrepreneurs’ discount factor 0.975
ae Habit formation parameter 0.8
j Weight of housing in utility function 0.2
γp Share of patient households in the economy 2/5
γi Share of impatient households in the economy 2/5
γe Share of entrepreneurs in the economy 1/5
ξ Share of patient households in the production process 0.80
σ Elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods bundles 2
θD Parameter for households’ portfolio adjustment cost 0.001
D Steady-state level of deposits 1
n Home’s relative size 0.34
ωH Steady-state import share in home 0.33
ωF Steady-state import share in foreign 0.17
η Inverse of the Frisch elasticity 1
α Capital share in the production function 0.20
ξ Wage share of patient households 0.80
φ Inverse of the Frisch elasticity 1
mE Entrepreneurs’ constant LTV ratio 0.35
mIY Output sensitivity of entrepreneurs’ LTV ratio 0.5
mEY Output sensitivity of impatient households’ LTV ratio 0.5
mI Impatient households’ constant LTV ratio 0.7
h Fixed housing supply 1;
δk Depreciation rate of physical capital 0.025
κI Investment adjustment cost parameter 5
κp Adjustment cost for changing prices 28.65
γ Bank’s elasticity of substitution between lending to both regions 2
θ Bank capital adjustment cost 11
ν Target capital-to-asset ratio 0.09
δb Cost for managing the bank’s capital position 0.049
φπ Inflation gap Taylor rule parameter 1.5
ρ Monetary policy inertia 0.70
ρmk Persistence of retailers’ cost-push shock 0.306
ρa Persistence of technology shock 0.936
ρs Persistence of discount factor shock 0.906
σmp Std. deviation of monetary policy shock 0.002
σmk Std. deviation of cost-push shock 0.634
σa Std. deviation of technology shock 0.006
σs Std. deviation of discount factor shock 0.018
CROSS-BORDER BANKING AND MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICIES 275
Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1365100518000214
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Technische Informationsbibliothek (TIB Hannover), on 21 Dec 2021 at 07:57:30, subject to the
for simplicity equal to the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign
goods bundles, σ , at 2. Note that this is in line with the estimates in Poutineau and
Vermandel (2015). The degree of monetary policy inertia is set at 0.7, and φπ is
set at 1.5, as it is standard in the literature.
We set the relative size of the home and foreign economies at 0.34 and 0.66,
respectively, to reflect the asymmetric economic size of the periphery and the
core regions of EMU according to our definition [Engler et al. (2017)]. Finally,
we adopt the estimated values for the Euro area of the standard deviations of
the technology, cost-push and monetary policy shocks (and the autoregressive
parameters of the first two) from Gerali et al. (2010), and the estimated values
of the standard deviation and the autoregressive parameter of the discount factor
shock from Iacoviello and Neri (2010).
3.2. Asymmetric Technology Shock and Discount Factor Shock to the
Core Region
In order to illustrate the different mechanisms at work in the present theoretical
framework, in the following, we discuss the dynamic adjustments of the model’s
main endogenous variables to an unexpected one-time TFP shock to the core
region, as well as to an unexpected one-time discount factor shock also to the core
region. In both cases, we assume the baseline scenario with constant LTV ratios
for entrepreneurs and impatient households.
As illustrated in Figure 2, the immediate effect of an unexpected asymmetric
TFP shock in the core region is an increase in aggregate output and a decrease in
price inflation in the core, which leads to a reduction of the policy interest rate by
the monetary union’s central bank and, by extension, to a reduction in the loan rate.
Together with the positive effect of the TFP shock on entrepreneurs’ net worth,
this boosts aggregate loans in the core and increases investment by entrepreneurs
and housing of impatient households. The overall economic expansion leads also
to an increase in household private consumption in the core, as well as in housing
prices.
Although prices fall in both regions following the TFP shock, they decrease by
more in the core which leads to a deterioration of the core’s terms of trade (an
improvement in the core’s competitiveness) and a real exchange rate depreciation.
Through the trade channel, over time output in the core is thus additionally boosted
by consumers’ demand shifting from the periphery to the core, as evident from
the response of the trade balance.
Via the financial channel, however, the periphery also benefits somewhat from
the TFP shock in the core: As loan rates drop in the periphery as well, after an
initial drop in aggregate loans, we observe loans picking up also in the periphery,
which leads to an increase in investment by entrepreneurs and housing of impatient
households, while aggregate consumption drops for a prolonged period. Hence,
aggregate output also rises some periods after the shock, albeit with a smaller
expansion than in the core. The fall in loan rates to both regions seems to dominate
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FIGURE 2. Dynamic adjustments after a TFP shock in the core region. All rates are shown
as absolute deviations from steady state, expressed in percentage points. All other variables
are percentage deviations from their respective steady-state levels.
over the increase in loan supply, as we observe a drop in the bank’s profits and a
persistent increase in the leverage position.
Next, we evaluate the impact of a stochastic discount factor shock in the core
with constant LTV ratios. The discount factor shock causes patient households in
the core to become more patient, thus favoring future consumption over current
consumption. As shown in Figure 3, this leads to a fall in aggregate consumption
as well as aggregate output in the core. The fall in consumption demand from the
core also negatively affects demand and retail prices in the periphery. Due to the
fall in aggregate demand, retail prices drop in both regions with a deterioration of
competitiveness in the core.
The drop in retail prices in both regions following the shock prompts
an expansionary monetary policy reaction. As loan rates fall by more than
the policy rate, we observe an immediate increase in loans to entrepreneurs
and households in the core, while loans in the periphery only subsequently
increase.
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FIGURE 3. Dynamic adjustments after a discount factor shock in the core region. All rates
are shown as absolute deviations from steady state, expressed in percentage points. All
other variables are percentage deviations from their respective steady-state levels.
Overall, the loss in international competitiveness of the core due to the discount
factor shock together with the more sustained boost in loans in the periphery over
time leads to a strong boom in aggregate output in the periphery, which is partly
driven by the trade channel, as can be observed by the shift in trade balances, and
partly by the financial channel.
3.3. Cross-Border Banking, Rule-of-Thumb Lending Standards and
Business Fluctuations
In this section, we investigate the implications of cross-border banking under
asymmetric information and the use of heuristics in the banking sector for macroe-
conomic activity. Figure 4 illustrates the dynamic adjustment of selected variables
of our model to a technology shock in the core under, first, constant LTV ratios
(baseline scenario), second, varying region-specific lending standards (scenario 1),
and, third, lending standards driven by the core (scenario 2). In all cases, we assume
that the output gap of the core is increased by a positive one-standard deviation
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FIGURE 4. Dynamic adjustments to a positive TFP shock in the core under constant
(baseline), region-specific (scenario 1), and rule-of-thumb (scenario 2) lending standards.
All rates are shown as absolute deviations from steady state, expressed in percentage points.
All other variables are percentage deviations from their respective steady-state levels.
shock in that region’s TFP, AFt , leaving all other variables (and especially TFP in
the periphery) unchanged.
As shown in Figure 4, a positive shock to TFP in the core leads to an expansion
in aggregate output and investment in that region, the latter being partly financed
by an expansion of lending to entrepreneurs and impatient households by the
banking sector. Note that this credit expansion takes place also in the baseline case
where both LTV ratios stay constant, but is of course larger in magnitude in the
two alternative scenarios, where mE,k and mI,k are a direct function of the output
gap. In these scenarios, we observe that the LTV ratios increase, which means
that households and firms can borrow a larger fraction of their net worth. Due to
the higher aggregate income in the core, there is also a higher demand for goods
produced there which requires an expansion of the capital stock and thus in the
production capacities of the region. This effect takes place in all three scenarios, but
is of course largest in scenario 2, where the LTV borrowing constraint (assumed to
be a function of the observed output gap in the core) is relaxed not only in the core
279
Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1365100518000214
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Technische Informationsbibliothek (TIB Hannover), on 21 Dec 2021 at 07:57:30, subject to the
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economy (where indeed an increase in TFP took place), but also in the periphery
region.
While the reaction of aggregate output in the core differs only marginally
between the scenarios (since in any case, the direct impact of the TFP shock on
the economy seems to dominate), we clearly observe the effects of cross-border
banking with heuristics in the case of the periphery: Awarded loans increase
markedly especially in scenario 2, leading to a faster and more pronounced boost
in investment and a smaller reduction of consumption. With banks softening
lending standards also in the periphery after the TFP shock in the core, the initial
fall in output in the periphery after the shock is overturned into an immediate
increase in output. Scenario 2 thus introduces an additional, financial channel via
which asymmetric shocks are transmitted in the monetary union.
Interestingly, the dynamics in the periphery economy differ quite substantially
between scenarios 1 and 2, with a less pronounced fall in consumption in scenario
1 and a more pronounced medium-term increase in both investment and aggregate
output. This is due to a different evolution of prices in the periphery relative to
the core when lending standards vary with region-specific output gaps as evident
from the response of the terms of trade. Under scenario 1, the initial fall in
the periphery’s output is exacerbated by an initial tightening of lending standards
which leads to a price path where prices in the periphery remain below those in the
core for a prolonged period of time, resulting in an improvement in the periphery’s
competitiveness position and, hence, its trade balance. This interaction between
the trade and the financial channel vanishes once lending standards in the periphery
are determined according to the core’s output gap which immediately increases
after the shock.
Regarding the banking sector, Figure 4 shows that the higher quantity of awarded
loans leads to a strong increase in the wholesale bank’s leverage in scenarios 2 and
1 compared to the baseline. In all three scenarios, the bank’s profits turn positive
about 10 periods after the shock, but the initial reduction in profits is lowest in
scenario 2. Overall, an extension in cross-border lending caused by rule-of-thumb
lending standards driven by the dominant core region leads to an excessive credit
expansion (in the sense that it does not occur based on any real changes in the
periphery) and a higher leverage in the financial system, and thus to a more fragile
macrofinancial situation in comparison to the baseline scenario and the scenario
of region-specific lending standards.
Next, we evaluate the effect of rule-of-thumb lending standards on the econ-
omy’s reaction to a discount factor shock occurring in the core region. As shown in
Figure 5, the discount factor shock leads patient households to prefer future over
current consumption, which causes consumption, output, and to a lesser extent
also investment, in the core to fall. Via both the trade channel and the financial
channel, consumption and output initially fall also in the periphery. The shock thus
leads to an initial drop in aggregate output in both regions, which in scenarios 1
and 2 causes banks to enforce stricter lending conditions as firms and households
are only allowed to borrow against a smaller fraction of their net worth, equivalent
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FIGURE 5. Dynamic adjustments to a positive discount factor shock in the core under
constant (baseline), region-specific (scenario 1), and rule-of-thumb (scenario 2) lending
standards. All rates are shown as absolute deviations from steady state, expressed in percent-
age points. All other variables are percentage deviations from their respective steady-state
levels.
to a drop in the LTV constraint. This effect becomes stronger in the periphery in
scenario 2 where the larger fall in output in the core is translated also in a larger
drop of the LTV ratio in the periphery.
Since loan rates drop together with the expansive monetary policy reaction to
the discount factor shock in both regions, as shown in Figure 3, awarded loans
increase in both regions in spite of stricter lending conditions. Investment picks
up more quickly in both regions as lending conditions improve again in scenarios
1 and 2, leading to a faster recovery of output after the shock. Overall, we note
that the different lending scenarios affect the regions’ aggregate response to the
discount factor shock by less than in the case of the TFP shock. This is because the
discount factor shock influences patient households who are not directly affected
by changes in lending standards. By contrast, a positive technology shock directly
improves entrepreneurs’ lending position. However, there is a remarkable effect
on the terms of trade and the trade balances in scenario 1, which in turn affects
the consumption path of each region: Because retail prices fall initially more in
the periphery than in the core region, the terms of trade shift in favor of the
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periphery, leading to an improvement of its trade balance in the short-run and a
faster recovery of periphery consumption.
Finally, in order to assess the empirical validity of our model across the alter-
native specifications of the LTV borrowing constraints, in Table 2, we compute
the theoretical second moments of the Hodrick–Prescott filtered series (using
λ = 1, 600 given the underlying quarterly frequency of the model) as well as
auto- and cross-correlations of the main variables of the model and compare these
to moments of actual data. Data are obtained from the OECD for the macrovari-
ables and from the ECB for the financial variables. We define the core of the
EMU to consist of Germany, France, the Netherlands, Finland, Belgium, and
Austria, and the periphery to include Spain, Greece, Portugal, Ireland, and Italy.
We take logarithms of the data (except for interest rates and prices) and evaluate the
moments of HP-filtered series in line with the data obtained from the simulations.
All data are quarterly and generally available from 1999q1 to 2016q1, with data
on loan rates available only for 2003q1–2016q1. We choose variables in line with
our model variables, where loan rates are proxied with interest rates on housing
loans.12
Table 2 reports a variety of results worth highlighting. First, while the absolute
values of the standard deviations of real aggregates in both regions are three
to four times larger in the model scenarios than their empirical counterparts,
when expressed in terms of the respective aggregate outputs, our three model
variants match these ratios with their empirical analogs remarkably closely (with
the sole exception of periphery consumption). The absolute standard deviations of
loan rates and inflation are, unfortunately, not matched as closely by our model.
Moreover, the empirical data show that the aggregate consumption, investment,
loan rates, and inflation were more volatile in the periphery relative to the core
over our sample period. This stylized fact is also matched by our model simulation
across all scenarios.
As for the persistence of the variables summarized in Table 2, their first-order
autocorrelation appears quite realistic when compared to the data moments. Fur-
ther, while the dynamic (first lag) cross-correlations between the periphery and
the core regions (third and fourth columns) deliver a somewhat mixed picture, the
contemporaneous correlations (fifth column) between the periphery and the core
variables are again remarkably similar to their empirical analogs in most cases.
In summary, both the data and our model imply that the core and the periphery
regions of the EMU closely comove with respect to the dynamics of both real and
nominal variables, with the contemporaneous correlations Corr(xFt , x
H
t ) being






t−1). Overall, it seems that our
model is able to capture the dynamics within and between EMU regions quite
well.
Summing up, the numerical results discussed in this section suggest that cross-
border lending activities, especially with time-varying and procyclical lending
standards, can contribute to the magnification of macroeconomic fluctuations.13
This may eventually lead to sudden busts as was the case in Spain and Ireland.
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TABLE 2. Empirical and theoretical moments of the Hodrick–Prescott filtered
series (λ = 1, 600) of the key model variables (standard deviations of aggregate
consumption and investment in the core and periphery regions are expressed
relative to the respective output standard deviations)
Std. Corr Corr Corr Corr









Periphery output YH – Actual data 0.014 0.910 0.488 – 0.601
– Baseline 0.064 0.592 0.038 – 0.205
– Scenario 1 0.072 0.507 0.048 – 0.247
– Scenario 2 0.072 0.522 0.150 – 0.434
Core output YF – Actual data 0.015 0.893 – 0.619 –
– Baseline 0.055 0.403 – −0.143 –
– Scenario 1 0.067 0.340 – −0.156 –
– Scenario 2 0.071 0.292 – −0.126 –
Periphery consumption CH – Actual data 1.071 0.880 0.072 – 0.432
– Baseline 0.138 0.815 0.455 – 0.513
– Scenario 1 0.586 0.799 0.539 – 0.532
– Scenario 2 0.494 0.814 0.456 – 0.521
Core consumption CF – Actual data 0.333 0.840 – 0.231 –
– Baseline 0.141 0.889 – 0.491 –
– Scenario 1 0.463 0.876 – 0.490 –
– Scenario 2 0.480 0.889 – 0.501 –
Periphery investment IH – Actual data 3.286 0.832 0.485 – 0.605
– Baseline 3.763 0.937 0.757 – 0.861
– Scenario 1 3.650 0.928 0.748 – 0.873
– Scenario 2 3.563 0.929 0.739 – 0.877
Core investment IF – Actual data 2.214 0.904 – 0.652 –
– Baseline 2.715 0.898 – 0.858 –
– Scenario 1 2.475 0.872 – 0.748 –
– Scenario 2 2.384 0.857 – 0.739 –
Periphery loan rate rbH – Actual data 0.413 0.887 0.510 – 0.984
– Baseline 0.090 0.896 0.890 – 0.999
– Scenario 1 0.088 0.897 0.889 – 0.998
– Scenario 2 0.088 0.896 0.889 – 0.999
Core loan rate rbF – Actual data 0.292 0.758 – 0.789 –
– Baseline 0.066 0.895 – 0.900 –
– Scenario 1 0.064 0.896 – 0.901 –
– Scenario 2 0.065 0.895 – 0.900 –
Periphery CPI inflation πH – Actual data 0.836 0.829 0.672 – 0.887
– Baseline 0.042 0.681 0.680 – 0.956
– Scenario 1 0.041 0.655 0.661 – 0.917
– Scenario 2 0.041 0.668 0.667 – 0.956
Core CPI inflation πF – Actual data 0.685 0.824 – 0.813 –
– Baseline 0.040 0.685 – 0.674 –
– Scenario 1 0.039 0.679 – 0.634 –
– Scenario 2 0.039 0.679 – 0.668 –
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Further, the results highlight the need of a strict regulation of the financial system
and the lending standards, in particular, given the perfect mobility of capital
within monetary unions such as the Euro area. We discuss the role of different
macroprudential policy scenarios in the next section.
3.4. The Role of Macroprudential Policies
In the following, we analyze the performance of several macroprudential policy
measures in terms of their potential to stabilize aggregate output and the wholesale
bank’s leverage ratio, which we take as a proxy for financial stability in the banking
sector. We simulate the impact of macroprudential policies both in scenario 1 with
region-specific time-varying LTV ratios and in scenario 2 where the bank sets
LTV ratios in both regions in response to output gap fluctuations in the core.
Policy 1: Countercyclical LTV ratio
The first macroprudential policy we consider, which is also widely discussed in
the literature, aims to enforce macroeconomic stability by making the LTV behave
in a countercyclical, and not a procyclical manner [see, e.g., Brzoza-Brzezina et al.
(2015)]14:






, k = {H,F }, (55)
where φmY is the macroprudential parameter in control of the policy authorities
which decreases the procyclicality of the LTV ratio, or even reverses it if a value
large enough is set.
Policy 2: Leverage-dependent LTV ratio
Under this second macroprudential policy, the LTV ratio additionally depends
on the bank’s leverage ratio:












, k = {H,F }. (56)
Accordingly, when the capital-to-loan ratio of the bank is higher than the target
leverage level ν, they can relax their credit standards by increasing the LTV
ratio. By the same token, when the bank’s financial situation implies that its
capital-to-loan ratio is lower than ν, the LTV ratio is reduced. This policy is
thus meant to safeguard the stability of the banking sector in a conservative
manner, where the parameter φEKB measures the strength of this macroprudential
instrument.
Policy 3: Stricter capital adequacy requirement
Another way of tackling the problem of a too lax credit awarding by banks
both in the periphery and in the core of the monetary union is to increase the
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capital-to-loan target ratio ν. Under the third macroprudential policy experiment,
we thus increase the value of ν in the simulations.
Policy 4: Varying costs of deviating from the capital adequacy requirement
The fourth and last macroprudential policy experiment we consider here consists
of increasing the costs for the bank of deviating from the legally set target leverage
ratio ν. In terms of our theoretical model, this translates into an increase in
the parameter θ , see equation (46). Economically, a higher θ requires a closer
monitoring and fulfillment of the capital-to-loan requirements by the wholesale
branch, and thus—in the aggregate and over time—is likely to lead to less excessive
lending and a more regular fulfillment of the capital adequacy requirements.15
Figure 6 comprises the performance of these four macroprudential policies
concerning the stabilization of aggregate output in the periphery and in the core
region of the monetary union, as well as the stabilization of the leverage of the
wholesale bank branch in the two scenarios. Note that the x-axis measures the
increase in each policy parameter, respectively.
As can be clearly observed, there is significant heterogeneity in the performance
of the alternative macroprudential policies considered here: The results suggest
that the implementation of the macroprudential policy measure 1 [forcing the LTV
ratios, and hence lending standards, to be less procyclical or even countercyclical,
as also assumed in Brzoza-Brzezina et al. (2015)] delivers the best performance in
terms of aggregate output stabilization for both the core and the periphery region,
at the expense, however, of the stabilization of the wholesale bank’s leverage ratio.
Further, it is interesting to note that in scenario 2 the gains of higher values of
φmY in terms of the stabilization of the periphery output decrease as φ
m
Y increases
above a certain threshold value. This is because we assume that the banks’ lending
standards in both regions react to changes in the output gap in the core, thus forcing
them to be overly strict for the periphery economy if φmY becomes very large. This
effect is, however, not present in scenario 1, where lending standards depend only
on the macroeconomic conditions of each region, respectively.
The second best policy concerning output stabilization is interestingly at the
same time the best strategy concerning the stabilization of the wholesale bank’s
leverage ratio, namely policy 3: The enforcement of stricter capital adequacy
requirements (the union-wide bank’s target leverage ratio ν).16 It thus seems
that forcing the bank to be more conservative in terms of aggregate leverage
also reduces some part of the excessive credit dynamics over the business cycle,
especially in the periphery. Further, it is also noteworthy that policy 2 [described
in equation (56)], where LTV ratios are made to depend directly on the bank’s
leverage position, has a poor performance in terms of aggregate output stabilization
in both the cases and for both the regions, with a negligible effect on the bank’s
leverage stabilization even though the bank’s leverage is the target variable for
this policy. Finally, increasing the cost of deviating from the leverage target in
macroprudential policy 4 does not seem to significantly affect either the volatility
of aggregate output or that of the bank’s leverage ratio.
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FIGURE 6. Standard deviations of aggregate output in the two regions and the leverage of the wholesale bank branch for different
macroprudential policy parameters (φmY = {0, 0.25, 0.5, 1, 1.5}, φEKB = {0, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15, 0.2}, ν = {0.09, 0.099, 0.108, 0.117, 0.126}, and
θ = {11, 11.25, 11.5, 11.75, 12}) for scenario 1 (first row) and scenario 2 (second row).
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4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
What are the macroeconomic consequences of cross-border banking and a heuris-
tic and procyclical determination of lending standards? How can the destabiliz-
ing effects of the financial channel be mitigated by macroprudential policies?
In this paper, we try to shed some light onto these questions by setting up a
two-region DSGE model of a monetary union featuring a union-wide financially
constrained banking sector along the lines of Gerali et al. (2010) and Gambacorta
and Signoretti (2014), which allows us to differentiate the effects of cross-border
lending from the standard trade links of two interacting economies in a monetary
union.
Against the background of the recent emergence of macroeconomic imbalances
within the EMU, we investigate the macroeconomic consequences of asymmetric
and procyclical lending standards applied in a cross-border manner. Specifically,
we compare a scenario where the LTV ratio that banks demand of entrepreneurs
and households depends on the regional output gaps to a scenario where desired
LTV ratios are driven by the output gap from the core region, thereby relaxing
borrowing constraints for all borrowers in the monetary union after a positive
output gap in that region. The latter scenario is motivated by the observation of
converging risk premia after the start of EMU as financial markets applied the low
risk standards of the core region throughout the whole monetary union.
Our model is able to capture important characteristics of EMU data, such as
the higher standard deviations of most macroeconomic variables in the periphery
compared to the core, and the persistence and cross-regional correlations of the
main macrovariables. Our simulation results suggest that such type of cross-
border lending practices amplifies the effects of region-specific technology and
discount factor shocks in both regions of the monetary union, leading to business
fluctuations in the periphery after shocks in the core that are generated by the
change in lending standards, and not by corresponding changes in macroeconomic
fundamentals. Furthermore, such developments lead to a significant increase in
the volatility of all main macrovariables in both regions of the monetary union.
We thus show that under certain conditions the financial channel may exacerbate
macroeconomic imbalances originating via the trade channel within the monetary
union.
Given the significant effects that such a larger aggregate volatility implies in
terms of welfare costs, we conduct several policy experiments testing for the effect
of different macroprudential policies in reducing output volatility in both regions of
the monetary union as well as the volatility of the leverage position in the banking
sector. We can show that policies aiming at reducing the procyclicality of lending
standards captured by the LTV ratios demanded by banks are particularly helpful
in reducing output volatility across the monetary union. In addition, increasing the
leverage target of the banking sector apart from stabilizing bank leverage also has a
benefitial impact on output stabilization in both regions. By contrast, policies that
increase the costs of deviating from the leverage target or that make the allowed
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LTV ratios dependent on the leverage position of the banking sector either have
only small or even detrimental effects on output volatility.
NOTES
1. We disregard very small countries such as Luxembourg, Malta, and Cyprus, as well as the Baltic
countries that only very recently joined EMU.
2. The diffusion index is defined as the difference between the weighted sum of the percentages
of banks stating “tightened considerably” and “tightened somewhat” and the weighted sum of the
percentages of banks stating “eased considerably” and “eased somewhat.” Answers with “considerably”
receive a weight of 1 and answers with “somewhat” a weight of 0.5. The index has a range from
−100 to +100. See https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/pdf/ecbblsglossary.en.pdf for
more details.
3. Unfortunately, the bank lending survey data for Finland are not available, so that the core here
consists only of Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Austria. The survey is available from
2003q1 to 2016q2.
4. Since labor mobility in the EMU is arguably still considerably lower compared to other regions
such as the United States, we incorporate this simplifying assumption in the model. An extension
accounting also for labor mobility is left for future research.
5. Note that the assumption of a symmetric steady state with equal per-capita output in the two
regions implies that the amount of home bias in both regions is related to the relative region size:
ωF = n1−n ωH .
6. Note that given the assumed home bias in consumption, the households’ aggregate consumption
bundles in the periphery H and the core F and the corresponding price indices are not necessarily
symmetric. For detailed derivations, we refer to the previously referred papers, and to the online
appendix of this paper.
7. Note that we assume the loan rate to be equal for impatient households and firms and only to
differ across regions. Nevertheless, banks may distinguish between loans granted to firms or households
via the amount of borrowing granted given their specific LTV ratios in the borrowing constraint.
8. This seems to be a reasonable assumption for a model of the EMU, since bank credit is the
predominant source of external finance for European firms, see, for instance, Allen et al. (2011).
9. This assumption implies that throughout the monetary union, the market structure among retail
banks is similar. Since we assume that the representative bank acts internationally in both regions of
the monetary union, this assumption seems reasonable. The equilibrium spread between the retail loan
rates rbH and rbF and the policy rate rd is then a function of the markup μb , the relative region size
n, the substitution elasticity γ , as well as the equilibrium share of lending to each region.
10. We also considered estimating the current framework with disaggregated Euro area data, but
decided against it because a proper estimation of the cross-border banking effects at work here would
be a task beyond the scope of this paper due to their overlap with the global financial liberalization
since the 2000s. We leave this for further research.
11. Gambacorta and Signoretti (2014) set κI at 0.5 when analyzing cost-push shocks, but argue that
when both technology and cost-push shocks hit their model at the same time, their overall results are
not affected by the choice of a particular value of κI , see Gambacorta and Signoretti (2014, p. 155–56).
12. The detailed data sources are given in Table A.1 in the appendix.
13. This result is in line with the empirical analysis in Mittnik and Semmler (2018) who report that
a highly leveraged banking system can result in instabilities and downward macroeconomic spirals.
14. In the following, we focus on variations of the entrepreneurs’ LTV ratio, leaving the LTV ratio of
the impatient households constant. The reason for this is that we want to study the effect of alternative
macroprudential policies on aggregate investment in isolation.
15. Note that both policy 3 and policy 4 imply also a change in the steady state of the model.
16. Note that this policy implies a change in the steady-state leverage ratio which may have nontrivial
consequences in terms of welfare. These results should thus be taken with a grain of salt.
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Maddaloni, A. and J.-L. Peydrò (2013) Monetary Policy, Macroprudential Policy and Banking
Stability—Evidence from the Euro Area. ECB working paper 1560.
Mittnik, S. and W. Semmler (2018) Overleveraging, financial fragility, and the banking-macro link:
Theory and empirical evidence. Macroeconomic Dynamics 22(1), 4–32.
Obstfeld, M. and K. Rogoff (2001) The six major puzzles in international macroeconomics: Is there
a common cause? In B. S. Bernanke and K. Rogoff (eds.), NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2000,
vol. 15, pp. 339–412. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Poutineau, J.-C. and G. Vermandel (2015) Cross-border banking flows spillovers in the Eurozone:
Evidence from an estimated DSGE model. Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 51, 378–403.
Proaño, C. R., C. Schoder, and W. Semmler (2014) Financial stress, sovereign debt and economic
activity in industrialized countries: Evidence from dynamic threshold regressions. Journal of Inter-
national Money and Finance 45, 17–37.
Quint, D. and P. Rabanal (2014) Monetary and macroprudential policy in an estimated DSGE model
of the Euro Area. International Journal of Central Banking 10(2), 169–236.
Rotemberg, Julio J. (1982) Sticky prices in the United States. Journal of Political Economy 90(6), 1187–
1211.
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APPENDIX
TABLE A.1. Data sources
Variable Name Source Sample
Output Real gross domestic output OECD 1999q1–2016q1
Consumption Real final consumption expenditures OECD 1999q1–2016q1
Investment Real gross fixed capital formation OECD 1999q1–2016q1
Loan rate Interest on housing loans ECB 2003q1–2016q1
CPI inflation Harmonized consumer price index inflation ECB 1999q1–2016q1
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